Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: Feasible Options for Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes by Thomas D. Willett
Revised May 2002 
For Fordham/CEPR Conference  







Fear of Floating Needn’t Imply Fixed Rates: 






Thomas D. Willett 
Director, Claremont Institute of  
Economic Policy Studies 
and  
Horton Professor of Economics 
Claremont McKenna College 
and  
Claremont Graduate University 
 
 
Address: School of Politics and Economics 
Claremont Graduate University 
160 East 10
th Street 
Claremont, CA 91711 
Tel: 909-621-8787 
Fax: 909-621-8460 




I am indebted to Richard Burdekin, Eric Chiu, Pat Convoy, Yahya Hidayat, Eduard 
Hochreiter, Isriya Nitithanprapas, Ramkishen Rajan, Kurt Schuler, Pierre Siklos, Ozan 
Sula, George von Furstenberg, and John Williamson, for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. 




The criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas suggest that many (most?) 
countries are not good candidates for either of the poles of genuinely fixed exchange 
rates or freely floating exchange rates. Thus many countries should have an interest in 
intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, in a world of substantial capital mobility 
most forms of intermediate exchange rate regimes have proven to be highly crisis prone.  
The paper argues that the unholy trinity analysis doesn’t imply that intermediate 
exchange rate regimes are inherently unstable, but rather that exchange rate and monetary 
policies need to be jointly determined. The difficulties of maintaining such consistency 
are as much political as economic since temporarily pegged or managed rates create a 
time inconsistency problem. Therefore policy officials need some institutional insulation 
from short sighted political pressures. A problem with most intermediate regimes is that 
they have focused on particular forms of limited exchange rate flexibility per se, rather 
than the weight that should be given to the exchange rate in setting monetary policy. It is 
argued that OCA theory provides the framework for determining the appropriate weights 
and limits on the amount of sterilized intervention to maintain the consistency between 
exchange rate and monetary policies necessary to avoid currency crises. The paper also 
considers a number of the issues involved in integrating their approach with the literature 
on open economy aspects of inflation targeting. 
 
 
   3
I. Introduction 
  A number of leading economists have suggested that increasing international 
financial integration leaves many countries faced with a stark choice. The two corners 
hypothesis starts with the widely accepted proposition that substantial capital mobility 
makes a Bretton Woods type adjustable peg exchange rate regime highly crisis prone. Let 
us call this the unstable middle hypothesis. The two corners hypothesis, however, goes on 
to make the much stronger argument that not only is the dead center of the spectrum of 
exchange rate regimens (the Bretton Woods narrow band adjustable peg) not feasible on 
a sustained basis, but neither is any form of intermediate exchange rate regime. In other 
words, the unstable portion of the middle range is so broad that it extends all the way 
between the two extremes of freely floating and permanently fixed exchange rates.
1  
  The theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) yields a well-established list of 
(sometimes conflicting) criteria that affect the costs and benefits of adopting fixed versus 
flexible exchange rates. The application of a sensible range of parameter values to these 
criteria suggests that many (I would argue most) countries are not good candidates for 
either genuinely fixed exchange rates where domestic monetary policy is fully 
determined by developments in the balance of payments or for completely flexible 
exchange rates where no weight is given to the exchange rate developments in setting 
domestic policy.  
Very small open economies with considerable labor market flexibility such as 
Estonia are good candidates for the former and huge, relatively closed economies, like 
the United States, are good candidates for the latter. However, most countries have opted 
for intermediate exchange rate regimes and often for good reasons. While the currency 
crises of the 1990’s forced many countries into greater exchange rate flexibility, already 
some of these are displaying what Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have termed “fear of 
floating” and are reverting toward greater management of their exchange rates. 
  Combined with a belief in the two corners hypothesis, fear of floating would be   4
sufficient to cause many countries to choose to permanently lock in their exchange rate 
through currency boards, or dollarization or euroization. Indeed a number of prominent 
economists have recommended such strategies, typically based on the dollar for Latin 
American and the Euro for European countries. A central purpose of this paper is to 
argue that many countries still have a richer set of alternatives. One can accept the 
importance of much of the fear of floating literature and still urge great caution about 
decisions to effectively give up national currencies. The current woes of Argentina sadly 
illustrate the importance of not unnecessarily limiting the range of alternatives. Argentina 
was a good candidate for neither freely flexible nor genuinely fixed exchange rates. 
While Argentina scored high on the OCA criterion of currency substitution, it scored low 
on both the criteria of openness to trade and of labor market flexibility.
2 The central 
thesis of this paper is that it is possible for intermediate exchange rate regimes to be 
stable, but this requires that exchange rate and domestic macroeconomic policies be 
mutually determined in a consistent manner. It is argued that OCA theory can be 
integrated not just as addressing the issue of fixed versus flexible exchange rages but 
more generally as a framework for the weight that foreign exchange developments should 
be given in setting domestic macroeconomic policy. 
  This perspective suggests the fruitfulness of establishing a dialogue between the 
literature on OCA analysis and on inflation targeting in open economies.  These in turn 
need to be combined with consideration of institutional arrangements to limit short run 
political pressures on policy makers that generate incentives for the adoption of unstable 
policies. 
  Obviously such integration is an enormous task. The purpose of this paper is to 
argue that this is likely to be a fruitful perspective to adopt and sketch out some of the 
issues involved.  The concept of making exchange rate and domestic macroeconomic 
policies consistent is simple, but making it operational is not.   5
II. Not all types of Intermediate Regimes Need be Unstable 
  Some types of intermediate exchange rate regimes are still an option. 
International financial interdependence has indeed limited the forms that sustainable 
intermediate exchange rate regimes can take. It is not just the narrow band adjustable peg 
regime that has proven to be crisis prone.  Both Indonesia and Korea had more flexible 
exchange rate regimes than Thailand, but neither had sufficient flexibility to shield itself 
during the Asian crisis.  Nor has the use of crawling bands as a stage of exchange rate 
based stabilization policy escaped frequent crises. Mexico, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey all 
present recent prominent examples.  However, stable intermediate regimes have not 
become a null set. For example, Chile, Hungary, Israel, and Poland operated crawling 
bands for substantial periods without provoking currency crises.
3 
  It is not sufficiently appreciated that the OCA criteria give us a guide not only to 
whether or not a country should adopt a fixed exchange rate, but also to the weight which 
exchange rate developments should be given in monetary policy making under flexible 
exchange rates.
4 For example, the more open the economy, the greater the weight that 
should be given to the exchange rate. This proposition is quite consistent with a judgment 
that a country should be extremely open before it should give a 100% weight to exchange 
market development by adopting a fixed exchange rate. 
  Economists, of course, differ greatly in their views about the relative weights that 
should be given to different OCA criteria and to their empirical judgments about each 
criterion. Consequently there is considerable disagreement about where dividing lines 
should be drawn. I cannot hope to address these controversies substantively in this paper, 
but I can sketch out a framework within which such theoretical and empirical issues can 
be studied and debated productively.  This framework draws upon OCA and political 
economy analysis as well as issues of open economy inflation targeting. 
  One of the key elements to this suggested framework rests on a point recently 
emphasized by Jeffrey Frankel [1999]. Contrary to what is often assumed, the unstable   6
middle hypothesis is not a logical consequence of the unholy trinity implications of 
Mundell-Fleming open economy macroeconomics. Properly interpreted, what the unholy 
trinity implies is that with high capital mobility, domestic monetary policy and the 
exchange rate cannot be set independently of one another.  This doesn’t mean that 
complete dominance need be given either to external or to internal considerations. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy can be jointly determined in a consistent manner.
5 It 
might be objected that the whole idea of the government setting an exchange rate is based 
on a control illusion. However, there is little question that in the short run a government 
with sufficient international reserves or borrowing can set a rate by standing willing to 
buy or sell foreign currency at that rate. Problems occur, however, if the private excess 
demand or supply in the foreign exchange market become large relative to the countries 
reserve supply or ability to tolerate capital inflows.  This type of situation is likely to 
occur only when the market believes that the exchange rat set differs substantially from 
equilibrium.  To avoid such circumstances a country committed to set an exchange rate 
(at either a fixed or variable level) must be willing to adjust its domestic macroeconomic 
policies to promote rough consistency between the equilibrium and government set 
exchange rate. Where this consistency constraint is met, then the OCA criteria give us a 
framework (albeit less than fully precise) for deciding on the relative weights to be given 
to internal versus external considerations. Only in rare cases, should such weights yield 
corner solutions. 
From this perspective it is not limited exchange rate flexibility per se that gives 
rise to currency crises, but the inconsistency between exchange rate and monetary policy 
that so often emerges under intermediate exchange rate regimes. If the need for 
consistency always held in the short run then we would expect governments to rather 
quickly learn their importance.  Yet to an important degree the causes of the currency 
crises of the 1990’s mirrored those of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods adjustable 
peg two decades earlier. Obviously many governments failed to learn or at least to   7
remember the lessons of the basic unholy trinity analysis.   
We can explain this at least in part by recognizing that the consistency constraint 
is a medium or long term requirement that can be violated in the short run by balance of 
payments disequilibrium.  Where the disequilibrium is purely temporary it can be 
financed by flows of international reserves (sterilized intervention) without inducing a 
currency crisis.  It is when the size of the disequilibrium becomes too big or continues for 
too long that serious problems are created.  Determining the likely extent and duration of 
a payments disequilibrium is far from an exact science, however, and since adjustment 
actions are typically costly, governments tend to have an optimistic bias in their guesses 
of the future.  Combined with political pressures to adopt a short time horizon, such 
consideration suggest that governments will frequently manage intermediate exchange 
rate regimes with insufficient flexibility to avoid currency crisis.
6 
The higher is the degree of capital mobility, the less is the extent of inconsistency 
that can be maintained.  If capital mobility grows faster than government learning, the 
result is more crises.  This scenario explains a substantial portion (although of course far 
from all) of the large number of prominent currency crisis over the past decade. 
III. Avoiding Crises Requires Consistency Among Policies 
This perspective suggests that the key to operating intermediate exchange rate 
regimes in a stable manner is really quite simple – just make sure that exchange rate and 
domestic macroeconomic policies are set in a mutually consistent manner. While I am 
convinced that this is the correct way to approach the issue, what is simple conceptually 
may prove to be extremely difficult to implement in practice. Both technical economic 
and political considerations contribute to such difficulties. 
It is easy to think of policies that are inconsistent with long run equilibrium in the 
foreign exchange market such as trying to keep the rate of depreciation to five percent a 
year while running a huge budget deficit and expanding the money supply at a rate of 
fifty percent a year.  But determining the exact requirements of consistent policy   8
combinations is much more difficult.  I do not fully share the pessimism of a colleague 
who termed my use of consistency constraints as magic words without meaning, but I 
agree that the difficulties of giving this concept operational content should not be 
underestimated. It will be a substantial task which goes well beyond the scope of this 
paper.  My purpose here is to try to focus attention on the potential usefulness of this 
approach and highlight aspects of the research agenda that it suggests. 
Another key condition for maintaining workable consistency with government 
management of the exchange rate is that policy makers be given a good deal of insulation 
from short run political pressures.  While some have seen pegged exchange rates as a 
source of domestic discipline, they can also create time inconsistency problems that 
increase the incentives for adopting unstable policy mixes.
7 Indeed the political 
conditions for operating a stable intermediate regime are likely to be as difficult to meet 
as are the economic requirements.
8 Thus the design of domestic institutional frameworks 
for economic policy making is a key factor in avoiding currency crisis with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes. It is likely no accident that all three of the cases of successful 
intermediate regimes studied by John Williamson (1996) had the unusual arrangement 
that exchange rate policy was set by independent central banks rather than the finance 
ministry. 
One likely ingredient of sensible consistency criteria is the placement of limits on 
the degree of sterilization of exchange market intervention over the medium or longer 
run. A simple rule that would “solve” the consistency criteria is to require that all 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to be sterilized.
9 International capital 
mobility, while quite high for many countries, is not yet generally so high that short-term 
sterilization is impossible.
10 In such a world, there are types of shocks, such as temporary 
capital flows, where sterilized intervention may be optimal (and would not make 
currency crisis inevitable). Unfortunately, however, while optimal policy models can 
provide rationales for short run violations of the consistenci constraint, so also can short   9
run political incentives. These considerations suggest that research is needed on the 
magnitude and duration of sterilized intervention that can be safely undertaken.  An 
important component of such research is careful attention to issues of measuring 
sterilization and an analysis of the practicality of developing  quantitative measures for 
monitoring the extent of sterilization both by national officials and the International 
Monetary Fund as part of its surveillance activities.  
The optimal policy issues to be addressed are closely akin to open economy 
aspects of inflation targeting. This literature is still at an early stage, however. Some of 
the issues that have not yet been adequately addressed will be discussed below. From a 
full optimal policy perspective, focus on the external sector only in terms of effective 
strategies for inflation targeting is insufficient. Independent weight should also be given 
to the resource allocation effects of exchange rate variability. This consideration should 
be more important, the more open is the economy. Unfortunately, however, not just 
openness is relevant. As is emphasized in recent OCA literature, the nature of 
disturbances is also important. For example, the optimal response to a pure shift in asset 
preferences is sterilized intervention, while the optimal response to currency substitution 
is unsterilized intervention. This implies that a simple rule of leaning against the wind 
through official intervention in the foreign exchange market (with the degree of leaning 
based on the degree of openness) would not be optimal.  
IV. Some Open Economy Aspects of Inflation Targeting 
  Recent literature on inflation targeting has emphasized the importance of open 
economy considerations (e.g. Ball (1999, 2000), Batini and Haldane (1999), Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler (2001), Collins and Siklos (2001), Eichengreen (2002), Svensson 
(2000), and Taylor (2001)). These suggest that in general in open economies optimal 
Taylor rules for using interest rate adjustments to meet inflation targets will become more 
complicated and that simple targeting of short run inflation can set up dangerous dynamic 
instabilities. Thus policy officials should dampen responses to short run changes in   10
inflation due to temporary movements in exchange rates (or other factors). 
  These are important conclusions that seem likely to remain robust with respect to 
a wide range of models.
11 So far, however, the specific implications of only a few open 
economy models have been investigated and these fall far short of capturing the full 
richness of possible interrelationships among the interest rate – exchange rate- inflation 
blocks of open economy macroeconomic models. 
  A key point of pre inflation targeting analysis of this nexus–often addressed to the 
debate about the vicious circle of depreciation and inflation - was that the inflationary 
effects of an exchange rate change can vary substantially based not only on the structural 
characteristics of an economy such as its degree of openness to trade, but also on the 
cause of the exchange rate movement and expectations about and the actual degree of 
policy accommodation.
12 As a result, the inflationary effects of depreciation could vary 
greatly for the same economy from one episode to another. The resulting potential 
instability of estimates of the inflationary effects of exchange rate movements is an 
example of the Lucas Critique. The recent findings of substantial falls in estimated 
coefficients for countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico that had adopted less 
accommodative monetary regimes may be an illustration that the Lucas Critique can be 
quite quantitatively important.
13 
  The importance for inflation targeting of distinguishing between temporary and 
permanent changes in exchange rates has been emphasized by Ball (2000). 
Unfortunately, however, the specifics of Ball’s analysis fail to capture the full range of 
complexities involved.  A major part of the problem comes from Ball’s decision to define 
his exchange rate variable in terms of deviations from long run equilibrium.  He treats 
this as the change in the real exchange rate under the implicit assumption that the long 
run real exchange rate is constant, i.e., that purchasing power parity holds in the long run.  
  There is growing evidence of some tendency toward mean reversion in the 
exchange rate movements of the industrial countries, but this appears to be far from   11
complete and is consistent with changes in long run equilibrium real exchange rates as 
well.  Furthermore estimated speeds of reversion tend to be low, especially where shifts 
in the long run equilibrium rate are not allowed.
14  While there is a clear case for an 
inflation targeting central bank to ignore an exchange rate movement that will be 
reversed in a few months, where there is a cycle of a number of years the appropriate 
response is much less clear.   
  With modeling one must start somewhere and it is quite understandable that the 
earliest models of open economy inflation targeting start with simple building blocks like 
long run purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity.  My complaint is 
that the potential sensitivity of the results to these simple assumptions has often not been 
given sufficient emphasis.  I attempt to offer such warnings below. 
Ball correctly emphasizes that temporary changes in inflation due to exchange 
rate changes can cause problems for simple closed economy based Taylor rules. 
Adjusting the interest rate quickly to temporary developments could easily create 
dynamic inconsistency. Ball quite plausibly argues that “the inflation measure that is 
targeted must be adjusted to remove the transitory effects of exchange rate movements” 
(p.2). But the resulting complexities cannot be adequately captured by Ball’s formulation 
of the exchange rate variable.  
  Ball argues that while inflation targeting does require monetary tightening in the 
face of overheating of the economy or adverse supply shocks, this is not necessary in the 
face of “temporary exchange-rate depreciation” (p5).  The problem is that “transitory” 
and “temporary” can be subject to importantly different interpretations from at least two 
sources. One concerns the distinctions between one-shot and mean-reverting movements 
and effects on the price level versus the rate of inflation. The other concerns nominal 
versus real exchange rate changes and the formulation of the exchange rate variable in 
terms of the deviation from long run equilibrium.  
Assuming no effects on wage-price dynamics, a one time depreciation of the   12
nominal exchange rate would lead to a one-shot increase in the price level through its 
effects on the prices of traded goods. This would cause a temporary increase in the rate of 
inflation during the transition period. Should this force a tightening of monetary policy 
with price level targeting? Yes, but many economists argue that inflation targeting is 
superior to price-level targeting in terms of a combined inflation-output welfare criteria 
because it allows the monetary authority to accommodate a higher average level of 
employment in the face of shocks subject to holding average inflation rates within an 
acceptable range. This is what Svensson (1998) calls flexible inflation targeting. In such 
a case the objective would be to make sure that the higher inflation rate this period is not 
carried over to the next, not that future inflation be required to be reduced by the amount 
of the previous one time overage. One of the arguments for specifying the inflation target 
as a range is to give the monetary authorities some flexibility to behave in this manner 
without requiring a specific override to be invoked.  
From this perspective there would be no difference in the rationale for responding 
to a one-shot depreciation of the exchange rate and a one-shot supply shock. Thus, 
contrary to Ball’s (2000) argument, it is not clear that all permanent supply shocks or 
exchange rate changes should require monetary tightening. 
  Nor is it clear that temporary exchange rate changes should never require 
monetary tightening. It is common in the recent open economy inflation targeting 
literature to use changes in the real exchange rate (Batini and Haldane (1999)) or changes 
in the nominal rate relative to its equilibrium value as explanatory variables in the 
inflation equation. This can be a problem in highly open economies, however, since there 
may be quick and substantial pass through from nominal exchange rate changes to the 
domestic price level. Thus an initial one-shot change in the nominal rate that was not 
reversed would still be associated with a partial reversal of the resulting depreciation in 
the real exchange rate. Thus, for example, with a permanent depreciation of 10 percent of 
the nominal rate, but a 40 percent pass through to the domestic price level, the real rate   13
would initially fall also by 10 percent, and then appreciate back by four percent. This 
would generate more inflationary pressure than if the reversal of the real exchange rates 
were due entirely to a reversal of the nominal rate. Furthermore where the domestic wage 
process is responsive in the upward direction but not the downward direction to changes 
in the exchange rate and associated traded goods prices, then even a temporary 
depreciation of the nominal rate could lead to an increase in net inflationary pressure. 
  The focus on real exchange rates is understandable because a depreciation that 
merely offset higher domestic inflation should not be a source of additional inflationary 
pressure. Thus it is important to distinguish between exchange rate changes that are 
endogenous and those that are exogenous to the domestic inflationary process. Where 
there are strong feedback effects from the exchange rate to the price level as would occur 
in highly open economies, the use of conventional measures of the real exchange rate are 
an imperfect proxy for this distinction. Ball (2000) assumes that “temporary exchange 
rates fluctuations have little direct effect on domestic price inflation” (p.6) but this need 
not always be the case. This will likely be true for not very open economies when there 
are widespread expectations that the nominal exchange rate change will be temporary, 
but for such economies one might question Ball’s assumption that “the effect of exchange 
rates on import prices is the fastest channel from monetary policy to inflation” (p.5).  
For a highly open economy, the use of the change in the real exchange rate will 
understate inflationary pressure to the extent that an exogenous change in the nominal 
rate has had a substantial feedback on traded goods prices. The size of this problem will 
depend both on the trade openness of the economy and the time period of the analysis. 
For a monthly model this feedback problem should be relatively small for all but the most 
open economies, but where a long period is used (Ball equates his periods with a year) 
then these problems can be considerable for all but very closed economies. Perhaps a 
better proxy for the exogenous-endogenous distinction would be the change in the 
nominal rate adjusted by the inflation differential over the previous year or so.   14
  Another important open economy issue concerns the choice of policy instrument. 
Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility that is adopted in most of the open 
economy inflation targeting models to date, this has not been an issue. The interest rate is 
assumed to be the instrument and the main controversy has been about the extent to 
which a monetary condition index (MCI) should be used as an intermediate target. MCI’s 
are weighted averages of changes in the interest rate and exchange rate, both usually 
expressed in real term. The optimal weights in the MCI should vary across countries 
depending in part on their degree of openness to trade.
15 The types of problems with the 
use of the real exchange rate discussed above would also apply to its use in a MCI, 
although this should be less of a problem with respect to effects on aggregate demand 
than on inflationary pressures. Sometimes the MCI has been confusingly referred to as an 
instrument, e.g. Ball (1999), but it is more appropriate to think of it as an intermediate 
target with the interest rate or the exchange rate as the instrument.
16 
  The literature on open economy inflation targeting so far has focused primarily on 
the interest rate as the policy instrument. (Exceptions are Ball (2000) and Bofinger and 
Wollmershäuser (2001)). In many countries there is some scope for the effective use of 
the exchange rate as an independent policy instrument via sterilized intervention. 
Furthermore, even with perfect capital mobility, unsterilized exchange market 
intervention is feasible and often may be appropriate in open economies.   
Instead of following an interest rate target and allowing the money supply and 
exchange rate to be endogenous, countries could adopt exchange rate targets and as long 
as they then allow the domestic money supply and interest rates to be endogenous, than 
such exchange rate targeting could be a perfectly stable system.  There is a good deal of 
empirical analysis suggesting that for the large industrial countries pure inflation or 
nominal GDP targeting is likely to be substantially superior to pure exchange rate 
targeting
17, but this conclusion need not hold for all small open emerging market 
countries. A chief argument for using interest rates rather than the money supply as a   15
policy instrument or intermediate target is the instability of velocity in a world of 
financial innovation. Currency substitution likewise reduces the attractiveness of a 
monetary rule. The optimal response to a shift in currency preferences in most models is 
unsterilized exchange market intervention. On the other hand, the optimal response to a 
shift in asset preferences is usually found to be unsterilized exchange market 
intervention. The implications of currency substitution and shifts in capital flows for 
inflation targeting in open economies including the optimal degree of flexibility in 
inflation targeting should be priority topics for research. 
In summary, the literature on open economy inflation targeting has made rapid 
progress in recent years.  Much research is still needed, however.  One especially 
important area is the study of the robustness of results to assumptions other than perfect 
capital mobility and long run purchasing power parity.  An example is the weight to be 
given to the level versus the rate of change of the exchange rate.  In world of real shocks 
and imperfect capital mobility, this question becomes much more complicated. 
V. Beyond Pure Inflation Targeting: Implications of OCA Theory 
  Two of the most widely accepted propositions of OCA theory are that the more 
flexible is the domestic labor market (in terms of both wage flexibility and labor 
mobility) and the more open is the economy to international trade, the more favorable 
becomes the benefit-cost ratio for fixed exchange rates.
18 Clearly the more open is the 
economy, the more important is the external sector for inflation targeting. Beyond this, 
however, at some level of openness it becomes sensible on microeconomic efficiency 
grounds to give weight to the stability of the exchange rate over and above the 
contribution that this makes to the stability of the price level or inflation rate.  
  In the face of many types of shocks there will be a trade off between the 
variability of the prices of traded versus nontraded goods.  For a highly open economy, 
the stability of the exchange rate can be more important than the stability of the prices of 
nontraded goods.  But for many countries the best answer is likely not to be either-or, i.e.   16
complete weight on traded or on nontraded goods, but rather how much weight to give to 
one relative to the other.  For such “intermediate” countries neither a fixed exchange rate 
nor pure inflation targeting would be optimal. 
  This is especially true where the country in question does not have a high 
proportion of its trade with a stable currency partner. For example, while it is small and 
somewhat open, due to its diversified trade with Australia, the UK, and the US, there is 
no way in which New Zealand could have a meaningful fixed exchange rate in terms of 
microeconomic effects. For purposes of inflation control it could fix to another currency 
such as the U.S. dollar, but its trade would still be heavily affected by fluctuations of the 
dollar against the British pound and Australian dollar. Were eighty or ninety percent of 
its trade with the U.S., fixing to the U.S. dollar might well make sense for New Zealand, 
but not under current circumstances.  
Of course, as is emphasized by endogenous OCA theory
19, the act of fixing to a 
particular currency may be expected to increase the proportion of trade with that 
currency, so what should be relevant to applying OCA theory is ex post rather than ex 
ante relationships. The experience of Argentina, however, suggests that there will often 
be strong limits to the sizes of such changes.  Even after adoption of its dollar based 
currency board, Argentina’s ratio of the average of its exports and imports to GDP 
remained below 10 % while the percent of its trade with the US remained below 15%.  
See Table 1.  Indeed its proportion of trade with the US is little different from New 
Zealand’s.  On this score Canada and Mexico are much better candidates for fixing to the 
dollar with each having over 75 percent of its trade with the US.  There are, of course, 
other criteria on which fixing to the dollar does not  look so attractive.
20 
Table 1 also suggests that we may too often assume that size and openness vary in 
lockstep. While New Zealand and Panama each have populations of less than 4 million 
their trade ratios are substantially lower than for Canada with a population of 30 million 
and slightly lower than Mexico with a population of almost 100 million. (Of course   17
before its recent trade liberalization, Mexico’s trade ratio was much lower). 
  In general, the trade ratios of the candidate countries for EU membership are 
much more favorable than for many of the countries discussed as candidates for 
dollarization.  There is still considerable variation, however.  Estonia has a high trade 
openness ratio of 0.67, but only about 40% of its trade is currently with euro countries.  
Slovenia has lower openness (0.46) but much more trade concentration on the euro 
countries (over 60%) and of course the trade concentration figures will rise if more 
countries adopt the euro as well due to endogenous effects on trade pattern. Poland scores 
well on trade concentration but its overall level of trade openness is similar to Mexico 
and below Canada.  Particularly surprising is that despite its dollarization and population 
of less than 3 million, Panama’s trade openness ratio is only slightly higher than 
Canada’s. 
  While early OCA theory focused on openness in trade, more recent literature has 
explored the roles of financial openness. The effects of high capital mobility turn out to 
be ambiguous. While clearly reducing the feasibility of narrow band adjustable pegs, 
high capital mobility does not yield an unambiguous tilt toward either fixed or flexible 
rates in the absence of the specification of a particular pattern of shocks.
21 This result 
abstracts from the valuation effects of changes in exchange rates on unhedged foreign 
currency denominated assets and liabilities. While not emphasized in traditional 
international monetary analysis, such considerations were of enormous importance 
during the Asian crisis and are of major concern to Argentina.
22 Although this clearly tilts 
the balance toward fixed exchange rates, as yet little work has been done on how to 
evaluate the size of the shift nor as to how much this problem can be reduced by the use 
of better risk management and the development of domestic financial markets through 
the use of inflation indexed financial instruments and other methods. 
  Much better analyzed theoretically at this point is the role of international 
currency substitution in tilting the balance away from flexible rates.
23 Even here,   18
however, there has been little analysis of the quantitative magnitude of such a shift.
24 One 
of the big difficulties of empirical research on the question is the lack of data on foreign 
currency holdings. Most studies of currency substitution have utilized data on foreign 
currency deposits, but these can behave quite differently from currency holdings. Where 
there is a threat of confiscation then higher domestic inflation could well lead to a fall 
rather than an increase in holdings of foreign currency deposits in domestic banks.
25 On 
the other hand, where competitive rates of interest are paid on both domestic and foreign 
currency deposits, the effects of inflation and depreciation on shifts in currency 
denominations may be fairly limited. High currency substitution at the margin will 
increase the size of fluctuations in the exchange rate, but it is not clear that there will 
always be a high level of correlation between average and marginal levels of currency 
substitution. In other words, it is possible that fairly high levels of dollarization could 
coexist with relatively low levels of additional exchange rate instability due to currency 
substitution.  
  In general, optimal policy considerations suggest giving greater weight to the 
exchange rate, the more open the economy to trade and the less are changes in nominal 
exchange rates due to changes in equilibrium real rates. Optimal policy models also 
imply the general superiority of discretion over rules. On the other hand, the absence of 
politically autonomous benevolent and wise decision makers presents a strong case for 
rules. Inflation targeting must be seen in this light. Of course optimal policy 
considerations are relevant for the development of strategies for “non optimal” but 
socially beneficial constraining rules. They may offer important insights both for the 
nature of the constraints and their degree of strictness or flexibility.  
In the limiting case where the structure of the economy is well known and there is 
only one type of shock then a constraining rule and an optimal policy rule may be 
identical. In more realistic situations, however, one must blend the benefits of constraints 
in limiting inflationary biases with those of discretion to respond to different types of   19
shocks.
26 A great benefit of inflation targeting is that it offers an attractive way of 
achieving such a balance. As long as one is well within the inflation target range then 
flexible inflation targeting allows scope for the monetary authorities to react to other 
considerations as well. The shadow of the constraint, however, implies that wise 
authorities would give less and less weight to other considerations as the outer limits of 
the inflation targets are approached. The more effective the political independence and 
credibility that a monetary authority has, the more the efficient balance would tilt toward 
flexibility. 
  For small open economies the alternative pure strategy is to target the exchange 
rate while limiting the likelihood of speculative crises by placing constraints on the 
amount of unsterilized intervention. In the extreme, this could take the form of 
dollarization or a currency board, but a much wider range of options should be feasible 
and should be especially attractive for countries with high but not extreme levels of 
openness.  
  In principle one could approach the design systems for exchange rate targeting 
systems in a manner similar to that of inflation targeting. It seems likely that the bands 
for exchange rate targets should be wider than those for inflation targets, with the 
exchange rate bands being typically based on OCA criteria. Just as inflation targeting 
requires the choice of price index, exchange rate targeting requires the choice of a 
particular currency or weighted basket of currencies on which to base the target. This 
choice raises a complicated set of issues including the weights to give to trade versus 
financial relationships is one of the most important. While credibility considerations 
generally favor the use of a single currency, this is likely to be desirable on a balance of 
criteria only where trade and finance is highly concentrated or where there appears to be 
no other feasible way of restoring credibility.  Most difficult to deal with is the set 
of countries (the size of which we currently know relatively little about) which fall into a 
range for which the OCA criteria suggest that neither tight or flexible inflation nor tight   20
or flexible exchange rate targeting is the clearly superior approach to take. 
  We know that we cannot consistently use only one instrument to meet two targets. 
The use of fiscal policy and sterilized intervention can give additional degrees of 
freedom, but these instruments have only a limited time degree of independence and their 
use can create dangers of policy inconsistencies that can give rise to speculative crisis. 
Thus there are dangers to adopting both inflation and exchange rate targets.
27 From an 
optimal policy standpoint one could specify a rule that was a weighted average of the two 
targets.  Where high confidence is lacking, however, such an approach would seem 
unlikely to provide a credibility enhancing form of a constraint system. On the other 
hand, where there is a highly respected independent central bank, the scope for more 
complicated targets should be much greater. 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
  A central message of this paper is a cautionary one.  There are great attractions to 
adopting fixed exchange rates in the short run, especially if a country is suffering from 
macroeconomic and/or political instability, but there can be enormous longer run costs if 
the country doesn’t reasonably approximate OCA criteria. Argentina is a sad case in 
point. Some enthusiasts for fixed exchange rates invoke endogenous OCA theory to 
argue that the act of adopting a fixed rate will induce structural changes that will improve 
a countries score on OCA grounds. In general I believe this approach is qualitatively 
correct. But this is an issue for which the magnitude of effects, not just their signs, is 
important. The fixing of the peso-dollar exchange rate does appear to have led to some 
increase in the flexibility of Argentina’s labor markets, but whatever the degree of this 
endogenous increase in flexibility, it was clearly insufficient to avoid a severe and 
prolonged recession.  
It is too soon to tell how much endogenous responses will help the members of 
the European Monetary Union to better meet the OCA criteria, but for many prospective 
new members it would seem wise to assess how EMU works for a good length of time   21
before deciding whether or not to join. 
  Floating rates are not a panacea either, however.  The fear of floating literature, 
while often implying excessive net benefits from fixed exchange rates, does point to 
many problems with independent floating that deserve serious attention.  We need to 
learn much more about the quantitative effects of factors such as currency substitution 
and liability dollarization on the stability and optimality of different monetary cum 
exchange rate regimes.    
I conjecture that such analysis will not overturn the implication (often not 
recognized) of current OCA analysis that for many, if not most, countries the weight 
given to foreign exchange market developments in sedting domestic monetary policy 
should be neither zero nor one. The problem of the unstable middle can be attacked 
without requiring corner solutions if it is approached as an issue of consistency between 
exchange rate and monetary policy, rather than as one of limited exchange rate flexibility 
per se.  The operation of crisis avoiding intermediate exchange rate cum monetary policy 
regimes is extremely difficult, however, in a world of strong short-run political pressures. 
Thus the design of stable intermediate policy frameworks will require careful attention to 
political as well as economic and financial considerations.  This will be a challenging, but 
let us hope not an impossible, task.     22
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Table 1 
 
Size and Trade Ratio of Selected Countries 
 
 
Countries  Population  Openness  % Trade with U.S.  % Trade with EMU 
 
Argentina 36.6  0.086  15.6% 
      
Brazil 167.9  0.065  23.4% 
      
Canada 30.5  0.357  77.6% 
      
Chile 15.1  0.228  19.9% 
      
Ecuador  12.4  0.314                   N/A   
      
Hong Kong  6.7  1.112  15.3% 
      
Indonesia 207.0  0.255  15.6% 
      
Korea, Rep  46.9  0.325  20.6% 
      
Malaysia 22.7  0.945  20.0% 
      
Mexico 96.6  0.288  80.9% 
      
New Zealand  3.8  0.245  15.3% 
      
Panama 2.8  0.227  37.2% 
      
Peru 25.2  0.123  30.1% 
      
Philippines 74.3  0.452  24.4% 
      
Thailand 60.2  0.437  17.9% 
      
Taiwan 22.1  0.399  21.8% 
        
Bulgaria 8.2  0.376    36.5%
        
Czech Rep  10.3  0.519    61.6%
        
Estonia 1.4  0.672    40.2%
          26
Hungary 10.9  0.546    55.1%
        
Latvia 2.4  0.352    35.7%
        
Lithuania 3.7  0.373    34.3%
        
Poland 38.7  0.236    57.1%
        
Slovakia 5.4  0.519    51.9%
        




Notes: Openness is measured by {(export + import)/2/GDP}.  
Sources: Direction of Trade Statistics, and World Development Indicator.   27
 
                                                           
1 Of course no exchange rate can be guaranteed to remain fixed forever, but the term is commonly used for 
hard forms of fixed exchange rates such as the gold standard, common currencies, and currency boards 
under which it normally takes catastrophic circumstances for the parity to be abandoned. 
2 I do not find credible arguments such as Hanke (2001) that its “currency board” had nothing to do with 
the Argentine crisis.  See Willett (forthcoming). It is true, as Hanke and Kurt Schuler point out that 
Argentina did not have a full fledged currency board and the unorthodox nature of the Argentine 
convertibility plan did help contribute to the crisis. 
3 See, for example, Burdekin, Nelson, and Willett (1999) and Williamson (1996). 
4 See Willett (  ). 
5 This point is also argued in Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001), which only came to my attention after 
the first draft of this paper, had been completed. 
6 See the analysis and references in Willett (2001a) 
7 See Willett (2001b) 
8 See Willett (2001) 
9 A number of writers such as McKinnon (1984) and Mundell (1961) have focused on this issue. Foreign 
currency purchases or sales by the central bank will automatically change the monetary base accordingly. 
This is unsterilized intervention. To sterilize the intervention, the central bank takes offsetting action such 
as open market purchases or sales of domestic securities in order to return the monetary base to the original 
level. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) pp. 597-99. 
10 See Willett, Keil, and Ahn (forthcoming).  The quasi-fiscal cost and effectiveness of sterilization 
depends on the size of capital flows and the nature of shocks. 
11 Taylor (2001) finds, however, that for the economies he analyzed the differences between optimal closed 
and open economy rules were relatively small. 
12 See the analysis and references in Pigott, Ruttedge, and Willett (1995) and Willett and Wolf (1983). 
13 See Choudhri and Hakura (2001), Goldfajn and Werlang (2000), Morande (2001), and Werner (2001). 
14 For surveys of the empirical literature on these aspects of exchange rate behavior see Frankel and Rose 
(1996), Froot and Rogoff (1996) and Rogoff (1996). 
15 There has been considerable controversy about both how much weight should be given to the exchange 
rate and how much weight has been given to the exchange rate in some relatively open inflation targeting 
countries.  Interestingly, the analysis by Collins and Siklos (2001) suggests that neither Canada nor New 
Zealand have given significant weight to the exchange rate in their policy making. 
16 On these issues see Byrant (1980). 
17 See Branson, Frankel, and Goldstein (1990), Bryant and Portes (1987), and MacDonald and Taylor 
(1989). 
18 For recent discussions and references to the literature on OCA analysis, see the contributions in 
Sweeney, Wihlborg, and Willett (1999) and Dean, Salvatore, and Willett (forthcoming). 
19 See Frankel and Rose (1998). 
20 For arguments for and against, see the contributions in Dean, Salvatorre, and Willett (forthcoming). 
21 See Tower and Willett (1976). 
22 See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Fernando-Arias and Hausmann (2000). 
23 See Berg and Borensztein (2000), the survey by Giovanni and Tortelboom (1994).  Berg and 
Borensztein show that even with considerable currency substitution, flexible rates may be superior to fixed 
if real shocks predominate.  They also show that the effects of greater asset substitution, i.e., capital 
mobility, are ambiguous. 
24 An exception in Panizza, Stein, and Talvi (2000). 
25 See, for example, Whited (2000) and the paper by Feige and Dean in this volume. 
26 See the analysis and references in Willett (1987). 
27 It is true that Israel did for a time have both targets as it transitioned from exchange rate to inflationary 
targeting. They were fortunate enough not face a serious conflict between the two targets over the period. 